This paper presents the basic setup of a network model of reputation. The model investigates how a reputation system can regulate opportunism and facilitate trust in low frequency or one-off transactions beyond an agent’s immediate network. The setup focuses on how the network facilitates access to transaction opportunities and determines the distribution of reputational information. When agents leverage trust over multiple homogeneously distributed transactions, the network structure determines a trust ranking of transactions between any two individuals. By incorporating how the salience of an agent’s reputation affects who gets informed, the model identifies additional gatekeepers who regulate the flow of information. These gatekeepers may receive limited trust but can facilitate trust between their links. The model views reputation as consisting of two parts. A collectively agreed upon norm and agents individual strategies given this norm. This provides a flexible framework that is tractable on a general network. Extending this framework by relaxing various assumptions, the model can investigate several interesting questions. In particular understanding the connection between local and generalised trust, patterns of informal sanctioning and the coordination on in-group out-group norms.