In this research paper Maria Perrotta Berlin, assistant professor at Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE) and Giancarlo Spagnolo, professor of Economics at University of Rome II and senior researcher at SITE, try to understand the evolution of the anti-corruption legislation in China over the last decades.

Authors argue that studying a 1997 reform and its effects can shed some light onto why the Chinese leadership seems dissatisfied with the current legislation and the likely effects of newly proposed changes.

The research results point to a substantial and stable reduction in the number of major corruption cases following the 1997 reform, a result consistent with a positive deterrence effect of the 1997 reform. Authors also conclude that one-sided leniency, conditional on reporting an act first, or unconditional, as when bribe giving is depenalized, may be powerful corruption deterrence instruments if well designed and implemented in the right environment.

Read and download the paper on SSRN or read the policy brief that draws on the paper on the Forum for Research on Eastern Europe and Emerging Economies here.

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