Microeconomics II

Course facts

Code:
PHD0502
Credits:
7.5
Study period:
2026-10-27 - 2027-01-18
Organization:
Department of Economics

Literature

Part A: Game Theory:

Required readings:

  • [LN] Weibull J. (2025): “Lectures in Non-Cooperative Game Theory”. Chapter 1, Chapter 2 except 2.3.2-2.3.4, Chapter 3 except 3.7.2-3.7.5, Chapter 4, Chapter 5 except 5.1.2 and 5.6-5.7, Chapter 6.
  • [MWG] Mas Colell, Whinston and Green (1995): "Microeconomic Theory", Oxford University Press. Chapters 7-9. Section 12.D and Appendix A in Chapter 12.

Recommended readings:

  1. Fudenberg D. and J. Tirole (1991): Game Theory, MIT Press.
  2. Gibbons R. (1992): A Primer in Game Theory, Harvester Wheatsheaf.
  3. Kreps D. and R. Wilson (1982): "Sequential equilibria", Econometrica 50, 863-894.
  4. Fudenberg D. and E. Maskin (1986): "Folk theorems for repeated games with discounting and incomplete information", Econometrica 54, 533-554.
  5. Mailath G. and L. Samuelson (2006): Repeated Games and Reputations, Oxford University Press. Available online at SSE library:
  6. Osborne M. (2003): An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press.
  7. Osborne M. and A. Rubinstein (1994): A Course in Game Theory, MIT Press. Available online at SSE library:
  8. Savage L. (1954): The Foundations of Statistics, Wiley.

Part B: Contract Theory:

Reading:

  • Lecture notes by Marcus Opp (2022), Stockholm School of Economics. (**)
  • Lecture notes by Ilya Segal (2020), Stanford University. Chapters 2, 4, 5.3, 5.4 (**)
  • Bolton, P. and Dewatripont, M. (2005), "Contract Theory," MIT press, Cambridge, MA. Chapters 4, 6.2, 8.1, 10.1-10.5. (*)

**) Required reading

(*) Useful reading