

Victim-blaming Norms and Violence Against Women: Correcting Misperceptions or Morality Drive Policy and Behaviour Change?

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Motivation

- Violence against women still persists in both developed and developing world (WB, 2019):
 - 35% of women worldwide have experienced either physical and/or sexual intimate partner violence (IPV) or non-partner sexual violence
- In addition to **psychological** and **physical** there are significant **economic costs** associated with VAW (366 Billion € in 2021 in EU alone)
- **Problem:** What impedes the introduction of drastic policy measures to tackle IPV?
- **Social justification/acceptability of VAW** (e.g. b/c people might hold victim-blaming attitudes) is at the heart of this but ...
- ... very limited research on the social aspects of intimate partner violence (see, however, Gracia and Herrero, 2007; Uthman et al., 2011)

Related literature

Ongoing literature on the predictors of violence against women:

- male unemployment (Bhalotra et al., 2019)
- women's economic situation (Dildar, 2020)
- level of education (Erten and Keskin, 2018) and (Akyol and Kirdar 2022)
- asset ownership (Pereira et al., 2017)
- institutionalised help (Tumen and Ulucan, 2019)
- state-level restrictions (Asik and Nas Ozen, 2021)

This paper: less is known on the role that *social norms* play in normalising VAW thus hindering policy change and action (by institutions & individuals) against IPV crimes


Our focus: not just describing the problem (*norms* → VAW) **but also** on identifying what blocks addressing it

Victim-blaming norms and social acceptability of IPV


- Victim-blaming norms (and the stigma assigned to victims) increase social justification of IPV and can hinder reporting of and (policy) action against such crimes
- We posit that *social justification* is key in driving policy and behavior inertia by individuals (e.g. victims or bystanders) and institutions (e.g. police)
- Thus, changing perceptions about VB norms can affect the calculus of social (policy/behavior) change via two channels:
 1. **directly:** by altering policy preferences and behaviour (of by-standers and victims)
 2. **indirectly:** by altering subjects' own victim-blaming attitudes which then feed into policy preferences and behavior change (dynamic evolution of social norms)

Conceptual framework: Norms as higher-order beliefs


Victim and Perpetrator, Those in Community, Generalised Attitudes of Society



Conceptual framework: Norms as higher-order beliefs about IPV




Victim-blaming Norms and Inaction



Victim-blaming Attitudes around Europe

Violence against women is often provoked by the victim:

% totally agree or tend to agree



FLFP and Victim-blaming Norms





Figure: The correlation between victim-blaming attitudes and (a) female labor force participation (*left*); (b) the labor force participation gap (*right*) in EU/EEA (2019)

Source: Eurostat and own calculations

Victim-blaming Attitudes and Education




Figure: The correlation between victim-blaming attitudes and education

Source: Eurostat and own calculations

Victim-blaming Attitudes and Culture

Secular Values and Victim-blaming Attitudes




Figure: Victim-blaming attitudes and the Secular-Traditional dimension of the Inglehart-Welzel World Cultural Map; Source: WVS & Eurostat

Research questions

- What explains victim-blaming attitudes? What role social norms play?
- Can they change and how?
- What is their impact on policy preferences and behavior to stop IPV?
- And through which channels?
 - via misperception-correcting **info provision** or
 - by making them **salient** which triggers subjective moral comparisons (Am I better/worse than society)?

Our approach & contribution

- First paper to elicit **descriptive** VB norms as (incentivized) higher-order beliefs of others' attitudes/values
- Distinguish the effect of **simply eliciting** (i.e. self-reflection on own higher-order beliefs) vs. **providing information about** VB norms on:
 1. own attitudes
 2. **policy preferences**
 3. **intention to act** (e.g. report to police)
 4. **trust in institutions**
 5. **incentivized behaviour** (donation)

Distinction triggers relative moral evaluations *before learning about the accuracy* of their beliefs

→ gain insight on the understudied link between norms, morality and policy

Dynamic information provision about norms as opposed to static norms in comparison to the previous literature (**Bursztyn et al., 2020**)


Main take-away points

1. Social norms impact via **different channels** on attitudes vs. policy/behavior
 - Info provision corrects misperceptions and causes a positive change in attitudes **but fails** to enact policy or behavior change.
 - former simply due to conformity as initial perceptions were too “pessimistic”
 - In contrast, reflecting on own higher-order beliefs about others' views (norm elicitation) –absent any information– triggers relative moral comparisons and causes a sizeable *policy and behavior* response
2. **Mechanism:** perceived ‘moral dissonance’ btw own & society’s aggregate views drives policy and behavior change
 - *self-enhancing* moral comparisons act as a **motivational stimuli** (Lewin 1958) that ‘licenses’ change
 - strong directional asymmetry: self-assessed ‘morally superior’ ppl donate more
 - Some HTE (by gender) .. but also backlash


Sample

- Country: Turkey - the highest female homicide rates among OECD members (OECD, 2019)
- Representative sample in terms of: gender, age, educational attainment, employment status and region
- Recruited during first 2 weeks of Feb. 2022 via an online platform (Benderimki) with more than 250,000 members across all regions of Turkey
- Monetarily incentivized (norms + behavior elicitation)
- Pre-registered at Harvard Dataverse

Experimental set-up



Experimental set-up



Experimental design

We are focusing on two types of comparison:

- **Between Treatments 1 and 2 comparison:** allows us to identify the purely behavioural effect of priming norms (invoking belief formation)
- **Within T2 comparison:** allows us to identify the effect of providing information about prevailing social norms

Concepts

Outcomes

[Link to descriptive stats](#)

Experimental set-up in detail

1. Control group
 - 1.1 Pre-treatment demographics
 - 1.2 Placebo: A text on bees and honey
 - 1.3 Quasi-behavioural outcomes and policy questions policy other
 - 1.4 Attitudes attitudes
 - 1.5 Demographics
2. Treatment 1 group
 - 2.1 Pre-treatment demographics
 - 2.2 Treatment 1: Scenario scenario
 - 2.3 Victim-blaming (VB) Attitudes attitudes
 - 2.4 Quasi-behavioural outcomes and policy questions
 - 2.5 Attitudes
 - 2.6 Demographics
3. Treatment 2 group
 - 3.1 Pre-treatment demographics
 - 3.2 Treatment 2: Scenario
 - 3.3 VB Attitudes and incentivized norm (belief) elicitation (randomized order) attitudes norm
 - 3.4 Quasi-behavioural outcomes and policy questions
 - 3.5 Dynamic information update on prevailing norms (elicited in previous stage) update
 - 3.6 Repeat of scenario
 - 3.7 Repeat of preference/attitudes elicitation
 - 3.8 Quasi-behavioural outcomes and policy preferences
 - 3.9 Attitudes
 - 3.10 Demographics

1

¹We include pre- and post-attention checks for all experimental arms.

Results: Victim-blaming attitudes

| | Attitude PCA | Att. 1 | Att. 2 | Att. 3 | Att. 4 | Att. 5 | Att. 6 |
|---------------------------|-----------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|----------------|----------------|-------------------|
| Assignment: T2 (Norms) | -0.01 (0.01) | 0.02 (0.01) | -0.01 (0.02) | -0.00 (0.01) | 0.01 (0.01) | 0.01 (0.01) | 0.05*** (0.01) |
| R ² | 0.14 | 0.10 | 0.09 | 0.05 | 0.07 | 0.12 | 0.05 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.10 | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.08 | 0.01 |
| Num. obs. | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 |
| RMSE | 0.23 | 0.33 | 0.36 | 0.25 | 0.35 | 0.36 | 0.30 |

Region and day fixed effects are included. Controls= Gender, Education, Income, Age, Party, Patriarchy_{pca}.

Table: Attitudes Across Assignment Groups (Baseline group is T1)

Info update (within T2): Victim-blaming attitudes




Figure: Victim-blaming attitudes pre and post-information update in T2

Info update (within T2): Policy support and behavior




Figure: Policy support and behavioral outcomes pre and post-information update in T2

Results: Norms & Policy Preferences

| | Policy PCA | Policy1 | Policy2 | Policy3 | Policy4 | Policy5 | Policy6 |
|-------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Assignment: T1 (Attitudes) | 0.01 (0.01) | 0.01 (0.01) | -0.01 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.01 (0.01) | 0.01 (0.01) | 0.01 (0.01) |
| Assignment: T2 (Norms) | 0.04*** (0.01) | 0.05*** (0.01) | 0.02* (0.01) | 0.02* (0.01) | 0.05*** (0.01) | 0.04*** (0.01) | 0.05*** (0.01) |
| R ² | 0.16 | 0.21 | 0.07 | 0.09 | 0.11 | 0.12 | 0.12 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.14 | 0.18 | 0.04 | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.09 |
| Num. obs. | 3537 | 3537 | 3537 | 3537 | 3537 | 3537 | 3537 |
| RMSE | 0.20 | 0.32 | 0.24 | 0.22 | 0.29 | 0.27 | 0.33 |

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; City fixed effects are included. Controls: Gender, Education, Income, Age, Party

Table: Policy Preferences Across Assignment Groups

'Moral Dissonance'

- *Dissonance* == Difference btw perceived Norm and own VB views (computed for each statement)
- *Dissonance* > 0 \rightarrow **I perceive** society to be 'worst' than me ('I am more virtuous')
- Also construct *Aggregate Dissonance* var (sum & normalize across 6 statements)
- Code them both as cont's and categorical vars

[Link to descriptive stats](#)

Moral Dissonance, Policy & Behaviour

| | Policy (1) | Action (2) | Trust Police (3) | Donation (4) |
|--|-------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| Moral dissonance (cont's) | 0.12*** (0.03) | 0.08* (0.04) | -0.26*** (0.05) | 0.30*** (0.08) |
| Elicitation order (Norms 1 st) | 0.01 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | -0.04* (0.02) | 0.01 (0.03) |
| T1 | 0.01 (0.01) | -0.01 (0.01) | 0.05** (0.02) | -0.05* (0.02) |
| Women | 0.08*** (0.01) | -0.03** (0.01) | -0.02 (0.01) | -0.01 (0.02) |
| R ² | 0.10 | 0.04 | 0.06 | 0.04 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.07 | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.01 |
| Num. obs. | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 |
| RMSE | 0.21 | 0.23 | 0.29 | 0.45 |

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table: Comparing T1 and T2: The effect of aggregate numerical dissonance on policy and quasi-behavioral outcomes

Moral Dissonance, Policy & Behaviour

| | Policy (1) | Action (2) | Trust Police (3) | Donation (4) |
|----------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| Categorical dissonance: -1 | 0.014 (0.018) | 0.000 (0.020) | 0.065* (0.026) | 0.002 (0.038) |
| Categorical dissonance: 1 | 0.046** (0.016) | 0.008 (0.017) | 0.007 (0.022) | 0.060† (0.033) |
| Norms first | 0.013 (0.011) | 0.000 (0.013) | -0.036* (0.016) | 0.002 (0.025) |
| T1 | -0.011 (0.016) | -0.004 (0.018) | 0.012 (0.023) | -0.061 (0.034) |
| Women | 0.085*** (0.009) | -0.028** (0.010) | -0.021 (0.012) | -0.007 (0.019) |
| R ² | 0.102 | 0.042 | 0.055 | 0.036 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.069 | 0.008 | 0.021 | 0.001 |
| Num. obs. | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 |
| RMSE | 0.205 | 0.226 | 0.288 | 0.450 |

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; † $p < .10$

Table: Comparing T1 and T2: The effect of aggregate categorical dissonance on policy and quasi-behavioral outcomes

Results: Dissonance & Policy Prefs

| DV: Policy PCA | | | | | | |
|-----------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| | VB st 1 | VB st 2 | VB st 3 | VB st 4 | VB st 5 | VB st 6 |
| <i>Dissonance var</i> | | | | | | |
| Cat: 1 | 0.03** | 0.02 | 0.02* | 0.01 | 0.03* | 0.03** |
| | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Cat: -1 | -0.02 | -0.01 | 0.01 | -0.01 | -0.02 | |
| | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | |
| R ² | 0.18 | 0.18 | 0.18 | 0.18 | 0.18 | 0.18 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.14 | 0.14 | 0.14 | 0.14 | 0.14 | 0.14 |
| Num. obs. | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 |
| RMSE | 0.14 | 0.14 | 0.14 | 0.14 | 0.14 | 0.14 |

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table: Comparing T1 and T2: The effect of categorical dissonance on Policy PCA. Each column corresponds to one of the VB statements.

Note: **Dissonance** var takes three values: -1 (less VB attitudes than perceived norm), 0 (identical), or 1 (more VB attitudes than perceived norm)


Dissonance & Behavioural Outcomes

Table: Comparing T1 and T2: The effect of continuous dissonance for each individual statement on incentivized behavior (donation)

| DV: Donation | VB Statement 1 | VB Statement 2 | VB Statement 3 | VB Statement 4 | VB Statement 5 | VB Statement 6 |
|---------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Dissonance1 | 0.07 [†] (0.04) | | | | | |
| Dissonance2 | | 0.09* (0.04) | | | | |
| Dissonance3 | | | 0.01 (0.05) | | | |
| Dissonance4 | | | | 0.11** (0.04) | | |
| Dissonance5 | | | | | 0.14*** (0.04) | |
| Dissonance6 | | | | | | 0.08 (0.05) |
| Fixed effects | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Controls | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| R ² | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.03 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.04 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.00 |
| Num. obs. | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 |
| RMSE | 0.45 | 0.45 | 0.45 | 0.45 | 0.45 | 0.45 |

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; [†] $p < .10$

Mechanism robustness check (within T2): Dissonance and Donation




Dissonance & Behavioural Outcomes: HTE by gender

| | Policy (1) | Action (2) | Trust Police (3) | Donation (4) |
|----------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| Categorical dissonance: -1 | 0.016 (0.023) | -0.016 (0.026) | 0.040 (0.032) | 0.060 (0.048) |
| Categorical dissonance: 1 | 0.040** (0.020) | 0.003 (0.021) | 0.001 (0.027) | 0.038 (0.040) |
| Women | 0.082*** (0.013) | -0.035** (0.013) | -0.032 (0.017) | -0.003 (0.026) |
| Norms first | 0.014 (0.011) | -0.001 (0.013) | -0.038* (0.016) | 0.006 (0.025) |
| Cat. dissonance:-1 x Women | -0.003 (0.026) | 0.033 (0.030) | 0.051 (0.037) | -0.119* (0.056) |
| Cat. dissonance:1 x Women | 0.011 (0.020) | 0.008 (0.022) | 0.012 (0.027) | 0.038 (0.042) |
| R ² | 0.102 | 0.043 | 0.056 | 0.039 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.069 | 0.007 | 0.021 | 0.003 |
| Num. obs. | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 |
| RMSE | 0.206 | 0.226 | 0.288 | 0.450 |

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Victim-blaming Attitudes and Culture?

The Inglehart–Welzel World Cultural Map



Implications for policy

1. The behavioral channels that move (social & own) attitudes on IPV are **not the same** with those that change policy preferences **and** behavior
→perceptions of morality matter!
2. Information provision that corrects mis-perceptions is a double-edged sword: works only in very “pessimistic” societies but can backfire in others
3. Glass half-full, but, overall good news for enacting policy and behavior change: policy-makers do not have to **necessarily** engage with society's attitudes/values

Conclusions and next steps

- Social Norms have no direct impact on changing respondents' attitudes towards victim-blaming
- However by only elicitation social norms and incentivising individuals to introspect on their social anchors, we make them change policy preferences **and** behavior;
- We used the perceived dissonance (difference between own and society's aggregate views) concept to capture this mechanism;
- We observe gender asymmetry, women are more likely to change policy and behaviour (a.k.a. donation)
- Next steps:
 1. check the relative importance of info vs. sociological role of norms in shaping pref's
 2. exploit dynamic updating design
 3. Heterogeneity analysis: who are those who are more/less responsive to the presence (and info) about norms? How does it matter for policy?

References I

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Additional results: Conformism (within T2)

| DV: Dissonance (absolute) | VB st 1 | VB st 2 | VB st 3 | VB st 4 | VB st 5 | VB st 6 | VB PCA |
|---------------------------|-------------------|-----------------|----------------|-------------------|------------------|-----------------|-------------------|
| Norms first | -0.04** (0.01) | -0.01 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | -0.04** (0.01) | -0.04* (0.02) | -0.01 (0.01) | -0.03** (0.01) |
| R ² | 0.09 | 0.10 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.13 | 0.08 | 0.12 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.05 | 0.01 | 0.05 |
| Num. obs. | 1340 | 1340 | 1340 | 1340 | 1340 | 1340 | 1340 |
| RMSE | 0.24 | 0.23 | 0.21 | 0.25 | 0.26 | 0.23 | 0.16 |


*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table: The effect of random assignment to norms-first treatment (within T2) on *Dissonance*, i.e. the absolute distance between own attitudes and predicted norm.

Note: City/region and day FE, and other controls included as before.


Victim-blaming: Descriptive Stats I

Individual-level correlates of victim-blaming PCA




Victim-blaming: Descriptive Stats II

Victim-blaming Attitudes across Basic Demographics (T1 Only)




Numbers in parentheses indicate the count of observations per group.

Moral Dissonance (aggregate cont's var): Descriptive Stats I



[Back to main](#)

Moral Dissonance: Descriptive Stats II



[Back to main](#)

Social Justification of VAW and Culture

The Inglehart–Welzel World Cultural Map



Country group

- African–Islamic
- △ Catholic Europe
- + Confucian
- × English–Speaking
- ◇ Latin America
- ▽ Orthodox Europe
- Protestant Europe
- West & South Asia

VAW is justifiable (1–10)




Results: Dissonance & Policy Outcomes (dis-aggregated by statement)

Table: Comparing T1 and T2: The effect of continuous dissonance for each individual statement on policy outcomes


| DV: Policy PCA | VB Statement 1 | VB Statement 2 | VB Statement 3 | VB Statement 4 | VB Statement 5 | VB Statement 6 |
|---------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Dissonance1 | 0.05** (0.02) | | | | | |
| Dissonance2 | | 0.04* (0.02) | | | | |
| Dissonance3 | | | 0.00 (0.02) | | | |
| Dissonance4 | | | | 0.05** (0.02) | | |
| Dissonance5 | | | | | 0.07*** (0.02) | |
| Dissonance6 | | | | | | 0.05* (0.02) |
| Fixed effects | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Controls | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| R ² | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.07 | 0.06 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.03 |
| Num. obs. | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 |
| RMSE | 0.21 | 0.21 | 0.21 | 0.21 | 0.21 | 0.21 |

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Descriptives of outcome variables



Differences between Predicted Norm and Actual Norm



But there is no systematic gender difference in the degree of social norm misperceptions (i.e. equally likely to make a mistake/get it right).

Concepts and Norm Elicitation

- **Victim-blaming attitudes:** A set of 6 questions on attitudes about gender and IPV (e.g. victim-blaming)
- **Social norms:** *Same* questions as above BUT we elicit (in an incentivized manner as in [Krupka and Weber, 2013](#)) respondents' beliefs about the 'views of the majority' in the society (i.e. in our representative sample)
- In other words, 'social norms' entail the **elicitation of aggregate (higher order) beliefs** (descriptive social norms)

Outcomes

- **Policy preferences:** policies that promote gender equality, protect victims of IPV, and reinforce the legal framework
- **Action:** if respondents would report a case of violence in suspicion
- **Trust in institutions:** respondents' belief that authorities will act upon info regarding a possible case of IPV
- **Incentivized behavior:** respondents can donate (fraction of) their earnings to a non-partisan NGO
- **Open text box** [not yet explored]

Scenario in T1 and T2

Last week, a tragic incident occurred involving Asli and Kerem, a couple in a romantic relationship. While on holiday in Antalya and driving to an ancient site, Kerem missed the turn several times, which led to an argument. The disagreement quickly escalated, and Asli left the car and expressed her desire to end their relationship. This triggered an intense outburst from Kerem, who responded with physical violence, assaulting Asli. In a fit of rage, Kerem pushed her off a cliff, and she died.

experimental set-up

Attitudinal Questions

VB ATT: After reflecting on the above situation, on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), how likely is that you agree with the following statements?

- 1- She should have kept silent and stayed in the car.
- 2- She should not have threatened to leave him.
- 3- Both parties bare some responsibility.
- 4- She should not have gone on holiday with him in the first place.
- 5- Killing her is not acceptable, but his mind was blurred by her insults.
- 6- He killed the woman with callous motives, and this is never acceptable.

experimental set-up

Prediction of norm in T2

NORM: We have surveyed a representative sample of the Turkish population. We would like to ask you to think about the views of other participants in relation to this incident. What percentage of them do you think would be likely/very likely to agree with each of the following statements?

Recall that if you answer the majority of the prediction questions correctly, you have the chance of winning a bonus payment of 500 Akce.

[Same six items follow]

experimental set-up

Update of norm in T2

- Participants see each statement, their own prediction and the actual percentage of other participants agreeing with each statement next to each other one by one. We calculate this percentage by using $Y_{i,t-1}$
- Updated dynamically every 12h

experimental set-up

Policy questions

[POLICY] How strongly do you agree with the following statements? To avoid more female killings and reduce the incidence of gender-based violence in the future:

1. The gov't should re-introduce the Istanbul agreement
2. The gov't should introduce harsher legal punishment for the perpetrators of gender-based violence
3. Police and courts should enforce existing rules more strictly and put more effort to protect women against gender-based violence
4. The Ministry of Education should introduce a course on mandatory sex education in the national curriculum of all high schools in Turkey
5. The gov't should allocate more resources and funding to state institutions that address issues of gender-based violence
6. The gov't should allocate more resources and funding to NGO's that help victims of gender-based violence

Other outcome variables

[*ACTION*] If you suspect that an incident of gender-based violence has taken/is taking place, how likely it is that you take one of the following actions: (1 very unlikely to 5 very likely)

1. immediately notify the authorities (e.g. police)?
2. interfere in person (verbally or physically) without waiting for the authorities to act first
3. do nothing immediately; it is not my responsibility to act

[*TRUST_INST*] In the event that legal authorities (e.g. police) were called upon an incident of alleged gender-based violence, how likely do you think it is that they will open an investigation? (1 very unlikely to 5 very likely)

[*OPEN BOX*] Please feel free to write any opinion you might have on this subject. What motivated you to pick the options that you have strongly supported.]

Other Attitudes

We ask the following attitudinal questions in this order:

- Ethnocentric attitudes
- Religion
- Ambivalent sexism (benevolent intimacy, benevolent protective, hostile) (Glick and Fiske, 2011)
- Patriarchal attitudes
- Virtuous violence (Fiske et al., 2015)
- Self-efficacy

experimental set-up

Result 4.2: Norms vs. attitudes in predicting policy preferences (within T2)

| DV: Policy Preferences (PCA) before info update on actual norms | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|----------|---------|
| AttPCA | -0.080* | 0.005 | -0.054 | 0.005 | -0.038 | -0.009 | -0.009 | 0.011 | -0.015 | 0.019 | -0.019 | 0.007 |
| | (0.040) | (0.044) | (0.046) | (0.047) | (0.039) | (0.041) | (0.037) | (0.041) | (0.039) | (0.043) | (0.036) | (0.041) |
| PN1 | 0.089** | 0.024 | | | | | | | | | | |
| | (0.028) | (0.029) | | | | | | | | | | |
| PN2 | | | 0.071* | 0.022 | | | | | | | | |
| | | | (0.031) | (0.030) | | | | | | | | |
| PN3 | | | | | 0.125** | 0.076* | | | | | | |
| | | | | | (0.040) | (0.042) | | | | | | |
| PN4 | | | | | | | 0.041* | 0.045* | | | | |
| | | | | | | | (0.025) | (0.024) | | | | |
| PN5 | | | | | | | | | 0.028 | 0.005 | | |
| | | | | | | | | | (0.025) | (0.026) | | |
| PN6 | | | | | | | | | | | 0.142*** | 0.094** |
| | | | | | | | | | | | (0.034) | (0.034) |
| Subgroup | Norm | Att | Norm | Att | Norm | Att | Norm | Att | Norm | Att | Norm | Att |
| Adj. R ² | 0.070 | 0.067 | 0.073 | 0.067 | 0.084 | 0.074 | 0.068 | 0.071 | 0.065 | 0.066 | 0.101 | 0.083 |
| Num. obs. | 665 | 626 | 665 | 626 | 665 | 626 | 665 | 626 | 665 | 626 | 665 | 626 |

The DV is policy PCA pre-info across all models. City and daily fixed effects are included. PN stands for predicted norm.

Table: Predicted Norms, Attitude PCA and Policy Preferences - Attitudes vs. Norms

| | VB <i>pca pre-info</i> | VB <i>pca pre-info</i> | VB <i>pca post-info</i> | VB <i>pca post-info</i> |
|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| T2 (Norms) | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.01 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) |
| Patriarch <i>pca</i> | | 0.36*** (0.02) | | 0.11*** (0.02) |
| VB <i>pca pre-info</i> | | | 0.77*** (0.01) | 0.75*** (0.02) |
| Adj. R ² | 0.09 | 0.17 | 0.65 | 0.66 |
| Num. obs. | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 |

VB = victim-blaming attitudes. Controls and city FE are included.

Table: VB Attitudes Across Assignment Groups T1 and T2 (pre and post info)

Descriptives

Table: Descriptive Statistics of Main Outcome Variables

| | Control (N=1093) | | T1 (N=1104) | | T2 (N=1340) | |
|----------------|------------------|-----------|-------------|-----------|-------------|-----------|
| | Mean | Std. Dev. | Mean | Std. Dev. | Mean | Std. Dev. |
| Attitude1 | | | 0.37 | 0.34 | 0.39 | 0.35 |
| Attitude2 | | | 0.54 | 0.37 | 0.53 | 0.37 |
| Attitude3 | | | 0.88 | 0.25 | 0.87 | 0.25 |
| Attitude4 | | | 0.30 | 0.35 | 0.31 | 0.35 |
| Attitude5 | | | 0.35 | 0.37 | 0.35 | 0.37 |
| Attitude6 | | | 0.82 | 0.33 | 0.87 | 0.28 |
| Attitude1 Post | | | 0.37 | 0.34 | 0.39 | 0.31 |
| Attitude2 Post | | | 0.54 | 0.37 | 0.50 | 0.33 |
| Attitude3 Post | | | 0.88 | 0.25 | 0.83 | 0.24 |
| Attitude4 Post | | | 0.30 | 0.35 | 0.35 | 0.32 |
| Attitude5 Post | | | 0.35 | 0.37 | 0.41 | 0.35 |
| Attitude6 Post | | | 0.82 | 0.33 | 0.89 | 0.23 |

Descriptives

Table: Descriptive Statistics of Main Outcome Variables

| | Control (N=1093) | | T1 (N=1104) | | T2 (N=1340) | |
|----------------|------------------|-----------|-------------|-----------|-------------|-----------|
| | Mean | Std. Dev. | Mean | Std. Dev. | Mean | Std. Dev. |
| Attitude1 | | | 0.37 | 0.34 | 0.39 | 0.35 |
| Attitude2 | | | 0.54 | 0.37 | 0.53 | 0.37 |
| Attitude3 | | | 0.88 | 0.25 | 0.87 | 0.25 |
| Attitude4 | | | 0.30 | 0.35 | 0.31 | 0.35 |
| Attitude5 | | | 0.35 | 0.37 | 0.35 | 0.37 |
| Attitude6 | | | 0.82 | 0.33 | 0.87 | 0.28 |
| Attitude1 Post | | | 0.37 | 0.34 | 0.39 | 0.31 |
| Attitude2 Post | | | 0.54 | 0.37 | 0.50 | 0.33 |
| Attitude3 Post | | | 0.88 | 0.25 | 0.83 | 0.24 |
| Attitude4 Post | | | 0.30 | 0.35 | 0.35 | 0.32 |
| Attitude5 Post | | | 0.35 | 0.37 | 0.41 | 0.35 |
| Attitude6 Post | | | 0.82 | 0.33 | 0.89 | 0.23 |

Descriptives

Table: Descriptive Statistics of Main Outcome Variables

| | Control (N=1093) | | T1 (N=1104) | | T2 (N=1340) | |
|--------------|------------------|-----------|-------------|-----------|-------------|-----------|
| | Mean | Std. Dev. | Mean | Std. Dev. | Mean | Std. Dev. |
| Policy1 | 0.71 | 0.36 | 0.72 | 0.36 | 0.75 | 0.35 |
| Policy2 | 0.86 | 0.25 | 0.85 | 0.26 | 0.88 | 0.23 |
| Policy3 | 0.88 | 0.23 | 0.88 | 0.23 | 0.90 | 0.22 |
| Policy4 | 0.74 | 0.31 | 0.75 | 0.32 | 0.79 | 0.29 |
| Policy5 | 0.77 | 0.29 | 0.79 | 0.29 | 0.81 | 0.27 |
| Policy6 | 0.66 | 0.34 | 0.67 | 0.36 | 0.70 | 0.34 |
| Policy1 Post | | | | | 0.76 | 0.33 |
| Policy2 Post | | | | | 0.87 | 0.22 |
| Policy3 Post | | | | | 0.87 | 0.22 |
| Policy4 Post | | | | | 0.79 | 0.28 |
| Policy5 Post | | | | | 0.81 | 0.26 |
| Policy6 Post | | | | | 0.72 | 0.32 |

Descriptives

Table: Descriptive Statistics of Main Outcome Variables

| | Control (N=1093) | | T1 (N=1104) | | T2 (N=1340) | |
|-------------------|------------------|-----------|-------------|-----------|-------------|-----------|
| | Mean | Std. Dev. | Mean | Std. Dev. | Mean | Std. Dev. |
| Action | 0.61 | 0.23 | 0.60 | 0.22 | 0.61 | 0.23 |
| Trust Police | 0.59 | 0.28 | 0.58 | 0.29 | 0.59 | 0.29 |
| Donation | 0.29 | 0.46 | 0.30 | 0.46 | 0.28 | 0.45 |
| Action Post | | | | | 0.60 | 0.23 |
| Trust Police Post | | | | | 0.60 | 0.27 |

Descriptives

Table: Descriptive Statistics of Main Outcome Variables

| | Control (N=1093) | | T1 (N=1104) | | T2 (N=1340) | |
|-----------------|------------------|-----------|-------------|-----------|-------------|-----------|
| | Mean | Std. Dev. | Mean | Std. Dev. | Mean | Std. Dev. |
| Predicted Norm1 | | | | | 0.47 | 0.33 |
| Predicted Norm2 | | | | | 0.57 | 0.34 |
| Predicted Norm3 | | | | | 0.84 | 0.25 |
| Predicted Norm4 | | | | | 0.38 | 0.34 |
| Predicted Norm5 | | | | | 0.46 | 0.35 |
| Predicted Norm6 | | | | | 0.83 | 0.28 |
| Actual Norm1 | | | | | 0.32 | 0.24 |
| Actual Norm2 | | | | | 0.30 | 0.31 |
| Actual Norm3 | | | | | 0.42 | 0.22 |
| Actual Norm4 | | | | | 0.15 | 0.30 |
| Actual Norm5 | | | | | 0.31 | 0.24 |
| Actual Norm6 | | | | | 0.69 | 0.32 |

Mechanism: 'Conformity' of victim-blaming attitudes to perceived social norms (within T2 analysis, prior to info update)

| DV | Diff. between own VB att & perceived social norm | Stat1 | Stat2 | Stat3 | Stat4 | Stat5 | Stat6 |
|---------------------|--|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Elicitation order | | 0.035* | 0.009 | 0.003 | 0.042** | 0.043** | 0.017 |
| Attitudes first | | (0.014) | (0.014) | (0.012) | (0.014) | (0.015) | (0.013) |
| R ² | | 0.027 | 0.023 | 0.017 | 0.028 | 0.039 | 0.028 |
| Adj. R ² | | 0.014 | 0.010 | 0.004 | 0.015 | 0.026 | 0.015 |
| Num. obs. | | 1291 | 1291 | 1291 | 1291 | 1291 | 1291 |
| RMSE | | 0.246 | 0.242 | 0.217 | 0.255 | 0.274 | 0.242 |

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.1$

Table: Order of elicitation and differences between own VB attitudes and perceived social norm

Result: Norms > own attitudes in predicting policy preferences (within-subject)

| | PP pca <i>pre-info</i> | PP pca <i>pre-info</i> | PP pca <i>post-info</i> | PP pca <i>post-info</i> |
|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| Predicted Norm | 0.12** (0.04) | 0.08 (0.04) | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.01 (0.02) |
| VB att | -0.05 (0.04) | -0.01 (0.04) | -0.04 (0.02) | -0.01 (0.02) |
| PP pca <i>pre-info</i> | | | 0.81*** (0.04) | 0.89*** (0.02) |
| Elicited first | Norms | Attitudes | Norms | Attitudes |
| Adj. R ² | 0.08 | 0.07 | 0.68 | 0.79 |
| Num. obs. | 665 | 626 | 665 | 626 |

PP = policy preferences, VB = victim-blaming.

Table: How Order of Elicitation Affects Policy Preferences

Aggregate dissonance (row aggregate)

| | Policy | Action | Trust Police | Donation |
|---------------------|--------------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------|
| Agg cat dis | -0.01*** (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.01 (0.00) | -0.01 (0.00) |
| R ² | 0.06 | 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.03 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.00 |
| Num. obs. | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 |
| RMSE | 0.21 | 0.23 | 0.29 | 0.45 |

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table: Comparing T1 and T2: The effect of aggregate dissonance on policy and quasi-behavioral outcomes, Agg cat dis= aggregated dissonance (continuous)

Aggregate dissonance (row aggregate), HTE by gender

| | Policy | Action | Trust Police | Donation |
|---------------------|-------------------|------------------|-----------------|------------------|
| Agg cat dis | -0.01 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.01) |
| Women | 0.08*** (0.01) | -0.03* (0.01) | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.04 (0.02) |
| Agg cat dis x Women | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.01) | -0.02* (0.01) |
| R ² | 0.10 | 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.04 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.07 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.00 |
| Num. obs. | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 |
| RMSE | 0.21 | 0.23 | 0.29 | 0.45 |

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table: Comparing T1 and T2: The effect of aggregate dissonance on policy and quasi-behavioral outcomes, HTE by gender, Agg cat dis= aggregated dissonance (continuous)

Aggregate dissonance (categorical)

| | Policy | Action | Trust Police | Donation |
|---------------------|--------------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------|
| Agg cat dis cat | -0.04*** (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | -0.01 (0.02) |
| R ² | 0.06 | 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.03 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 |
| Num. obs. | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 |

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table: Comparing T1 and T2: The effect of aggregate dissonance on policy and quasi-behavioral outcomes, Agg cat dis cat = aggregated dissonance (categorical, -1, 0, 1)

Aggregate dissonance (categorical), HTE by gender

| | Policy | Action | Trust Police | Donation |
|-------------------------|-------------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Agg cat dis cat | -0.04** (0.01) | 0.00 (0.01) | -0.00 (0.02) | 0.01 (0.02) |
| Women | 0.09*** (0.01) | -0.03* (0.01) | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.02 (0.02) |
| Agg cat dis cat x Women | 0.00 (0.02) | -0.00 (0.02) | 0.01 (0.02) | -0.04 (0.03) |
| R ² | 0.10 | 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.03 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.07 | 0.01 | 0.02 | -0.00 |
| Num. obs. | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 |

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table: Comparing T1 and T2: The effect of aggregate dissonance on policy and quasi-behavioral outcomes, HTE by gender, Agg cat dis cat = aggregated dissonance (categorical, -1, 0, 1)

Results: Dissonance & Behavioral Outcomes

| DV: Donation | VB st 1 | VB st 2 | VB st 3 | VB st 4 | VB st 5 | VB st 6 |
|---------------------|-----------------|------------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------|
| Dissonance1_cat-1 | -0.01 (0.02) | | | | | |
| Dissonance1_cat1 | -0.05 (0.03) | | | | | |
| Dissonance2_cat-1 | | -0.00 (0.03) | | | | |
| Dissonance2_cat1 | | -0.06* (0.03) | | | | |
| Dissonance3_cat-1 | | | -0.03 (0.02) | | | |
| Dissonance4_cat-1 | | | | -0.01 (0.02) | | |
| Dissonance4_cat1 | | | | -0.07* (0.03) | | |
| Dissonance5_cat-1 | | | | | -0.00 (0.02) | |
| Dissonance5_cat1 | | | | | -0.07* (0.03) | |
| Dissonance6_cat-1 | | | | | | -0.02 (0.02) |
| R ² | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.06 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.06 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| Num. obs. | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 |
| RMSE | 0.32 | 0.32 | 0.32 | 0.32 | 0.32 | 0.32 |

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table: Comparing T1 and T2: The effect of categorical dissonance on donation

HTE: Behavioral outcomes

| DV: Donation | | | | | |
|--------------------------|-------------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|-----------------|
| | St 1 | St 2 | St 3 | St 4 | St 5 |
| Gender (Women = 1) | -0.03 (0.06) | -0.02 (0.05) | -0.02 (0.04) | -0.05 (0.06) | -0.01 (0.06) |
| <i>Dissonance</i> | | | | | |
| Cat: -1 | -0.10** (0.03) | -0.04 (0.04) | -0.04 (0.03) | -0.06 (0.04) | -0.03 (0.04) |
| Cat: 1 | -0.00 (0.04) | -0.07 (0.04) | -0.02 (0.04) | -0.10* (0.04) | -0.04 (0.04) |
| <i>Interaction terms</i> | | | | | |
| Dissonance cat: -1*Women | 0.16*** (0.05) | 0.07 (0.05) | -0.06 (0.06) | 0.11* (0.05) | 0.05 (0.05) |
| Dissonance cat: 1*Women | -0.09 (0.06) | 0.01 (0.05) | 0.03 (0.04) | 0.06 (0.06) | -0.05 (0.06) |
| R ² | 0.08 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.07 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.03 |
| Num. obs. | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 |
| RMSE | 0.32 | 0.32 | 0.32 | 0.32 | 0.32 |

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table: Comparing T1 and T2: The effect of categorical *Dissonance* on incentivized donation; HTE by gender

HTE: Behavioural outcomes & Dissonance

| DV: | Policy | Action | Trust Police | Donation |
|-------------------------------|-------------------|------------------|-----------------|------------------|
| Aggregated dissonance | -0.04** (0.01) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.01) |
| Women | 0.08*** (0.01) | -0.03* (0.01) | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.04 (0.02) |
| Aggregated dissonance x Women | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | 0.00 (0.01) | -0.02* (0.01) |
| R ² | 0.10 | 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.04 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.07 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.00 |
| Num. obs. | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 |
| RMSE | 0.21 | 0.23 | 0.29 | 0.45 |

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Note: **Aggregate Dissonance** ranges from -1 to 1 (positive/negative values indicate more/less own VB attitudes compared to the perceived norm).

Table: Comparing T1 and T2: The effect of aggregate dissonance on policy and behavioral outcomes; HTE by gender

Victim-blaming Attitudes: Descriptive Stats I




Figure: Victim-blaming attitudes across key demographic categories

Victim-blaming Attitudes: Descriptive Stats I




Figure:

Info update (within T2): Over- & under-estimators of social norms

| DV: $\Delta(\text{VB Attitudes})$ | Statement (1) | Statement (2) | Statement (3) | Statement (4) | Statement (5) | Statement (6) |
|--|-------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------|---------------------|
| Under-estimator | 0.031 [†] (0.017) | 0.051** (0.019) | 0.020 (0.022) | 0.003 (0.013) | 0.019 (0.020) | 0.059*** (0.013) |
| Over-estimator | -0.002 (0.017) | -0.016 (0.017) | -0.027 [†] (0.015) | -0.044*** (0.011) | -0.022 (0.019) | -0.001 (0.010) |
| Order of elicitation (Norms 1 st) | -0.001 (0.009) | 0.012 (0.009) | 0.004 (0.007) | -0.003 (0.009) | -0.005 (0.010) | -0.016* (0.007) |
| Controls | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| R ² | 0.058 | 0.083 | 0.069 | 0.085 | 0.084 | 0.080 |
| Adj. R ² | -0.003 | 0.024 | 0.009 | 0.026 | 0.025 | 0.020 |
| Num. obs. | 1340 | 1340 | 1340 | 1340 | 1340 | 1340 |
| RMSE | 0.155 | 0.164 | 0.123 | 0.154 | 0.166 | 0.133 |

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; [†] $p < 0.1$

Table: First difference model: Under/over-estimation of VB norms and differences in post-treatment (information update) attitudes