News
SITE Research on Whistleblower Rewards, False Reports & Corporate Fraud
10 January 2018
Rewards for whistleblowers – is it an efficient way to detect crimes? Or will it lead to fraudulent reports, making law enforcement costlier and less effective in the end? These questions are at the centre of a heated debate, as US enforcement agencies have been increasingly relying on incentives for corporate whistleblowers, while their European counterparts appear weary of introducing them. SITE Professor Giancarlo Spagnolo, together with Paolo Buccirossi and Giovanni Immordino, try to shed some light on this debate by studying how an effective reward program can be designed.
Imperfect Financial Markets as a Commitment Device for the Government
21 December 2017
By Jenny Simon, Working Paper
Optimal Debt Bias in Corporate Income Taxation
21 December 2017
By Jenny Simon, Working Paper
The Political Economy of Multilateral Aid Funds
21 December 2017
By Jenny Simon (with Justin Valasek)
Centralized Fiscal Spending by Supranational Unions
21 December 2017
By Jenny Simon (with Justin M. Valasek)
Risk Aversion, Prospect Theory, and Strategic Risk in Law Enforcement: Evidence From an Antitrust Experiment
20 December 2017
By Chloé Le Coq and Giancarlo Spagnolo (with Maria Bigoni and Sven-Olof Fridolfsson), Working Paper
On the Role of Capital Gains in Swedish Income Inequality
20 December 2017
By Jesper Roine (with Daniel Waldenström), Working Paper
Common Trends and Shocks to Top Incomes – A Structural Breaks Approach
20 December 2017
By Jesper Roine (with Daniel Waldenström), Working Paper
Intergenerational Top Income Mobility in Sweden – Capitalist Dynasties in the Land of Equal Opportunity?
20 December 2017
By Jesper Roine (with Anders Björklund and Daniel Waldenström), Working Paper
What Determines Top Income Shares? Evidence from the Twentieth Century
20 December 2017
By Jesper Roine (with Jonas Vlachos and Daniel Waldenström), Working Paper