Material

Commitment And Entrenchment In Corporate Governance, Simone M. Sepe, Toulouse School of Economics

Contracts versus Institutions: A Critique of Corporate Governance Theory, Martin Hellwig, Director

Price and Probability: Decomposing the Takeover Effects of Anti-Takeover Provisions, Vicente Cuñat, Associate Professor / Department of Finance, London School of Economics

Can Staggered Boards Improve Value? Evidence from the Massachusetts Natural Experiment, Robert M. Daines, Pritzker Professor of Law and Business

Corporate Leverage and Employee Protection in Bankruptcy, Marco Pagano, Professor of Finance University of Naples Federico II

Three Ages of Bankruptcy, Mark Roe, David Burg Professor of Law

Political Determinants of Competition, Luigi Zingales, Robert C. McCormack Professor Entrepreneurship & Finance

Are Foreign Investors Locusts? The Long-Term Effects of Foreign Institutional Ownership, Pedro Matos, Associate Professor of Business Administration / Darden school of Business- University of Virginia

Does Majority Voting Improve Board Accountability?, Jill Fisch, Perry Golkin Professor of Law, Co-Director

Bonded to the State: A Network Perspective on China’s Corporate Debt Market, Curtis Milhaupt, Parker Professor of Comparative Corporate Law and Fuyo Professor of Japanese Law; Director

Corporate Governance Indices and Construct Validity, Bernard Black, Nicholas J. Chabraja Professor Northwestern University School of Law and Kellogg School of Management

Are CEOs Different? Characteristics of Top Managers, Steve Kaplan, Neubauer Family Professor of Entrepreneurship and Finance

Executive Remuneration Standards and the “Conformity Gap” at Controlled Corporations, Guido Ferrarini, Professor of Business Law and Capital Markets Law

The Responsibility of Business is to Pursue Shareholder Value: True or False?, Oliver Hart, Andrew E. Furer Professor of Economics