Higher Seminar in Statecraft and Strategic Communication | Ronan Mainprize
Abstract: Lyndon Johnson has often been caricatured as a classic example of a flawed intelligence consumer. The Texan President had a long-standing dislike for Langley based on issues of culture, class, and conspiracy. During the Vietnam War, Johnson and his administration also employed working methods that strained the US intelligence-policy nexus, neglected and politicised intelligence products to suit their strategies, and rarely used the CIA in an objective or effective way. Yet, while the relationship was indeed dysfunctional, throughout the wider global Cold War it was often more complex and varied, and Johnson was perhaps a shrewder user of intelligence than previous historians have acknowledged. During other international crises, such as the Dominican Intervention and the Six Day War, Johnson used the Agency for diplomatic, political, and communication purposes, sometimes garnering positive results. Meanwhile the Agency also suffered from numerous limitations in collection, analysis, and dissemination which furthered the White House’s inattention to their advice during their policymaking process. Ultimately, this all means that the argument that Johnson had ‘no concept of how to use such a finely strung instrument as the CIA’ appears as a charge in need of deeper consideration.
Bio: Ronan Mainprize is a PhD Candidate at the University of Warwick, specialising in intelligence, US presidential statecraft, and the global Cold War. His work has been published in Intelligence and National Security and the Journal of Intelligence History. Currently based in Stockholm, Ronan will be joining the Center for Statecraft and Strategic Communication as an Ax:son Johnson Postdoctoral Fellow.