Preferences for similar partners and complementarities in household production are often held responsible for the patterns of assortative mating observed in marriage markets along different dimensions, such as race and education. However, when the marriage market is segmented into racially and educationally homogeneous clusters, people naturally have more match opportunities with their likes. Segmentation can reinforce assortative mating, and thus economic inequality and cultural segregation, without generating the welfare gains usually associated with sorting in frictionless models of the marriage market. In this paper, we use panel data on relationship formation and dissolution to separately identify the marital surplus and search frictions in an equilibrium search model of the marriage market. We estimate the model with different U.S. data for the 1997-2017 period and find that meetings between people of the same race (education) represent 84.1%(38.9%) of all meetings, as opposed to 57.1% (24.5%) if singles met randomly.